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Articles 
WILLIAMS v. STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND NECESSITY 
OF SODOMY LAWS 
by Janet M. LaRue and Rory K. Nugent 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest 
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution.) 
Although Justice White's words of admonition may 
have been intended for the Supreme Court alone, they 
succinctly defme for all of us the role of the judiciary in a 
three-branched system of government. 2 The message is 
clear: state courts, with no inherent powers to create public 
policy, undermine their viability when they pull 
jurisprudential rabbits out of hats and fashion new rights 
from their respective state constitutions. In Bowers v. 
HardWick, the United States Supreme Court expressed 
that it had dealt sufficiently with "emanating penumbras" 
and meticulous historical analysis, and declined to create 
a federal constitutional right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy based on such analysis.3 However, in Williams 
v. State,4 the Circuit Court for Baltimore City recently 
delved into issue with dangerous consequences. 
Despite the weak legal foundation of the Williams 
case, the circuit court found that a valid law, which served 
as a necessary means of protecting public health and 
morality, did not apply to private, consensual, non-
commercial sexual activity. 5 It is well recognized that the 
states have broad powers to legislate with regard to these 
I Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986) (finding no constitutional 
right to engage in homosexual behavior). 
2 See id. at 194-95. 
3 See id. 
4 No. 980360311CC-1 059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 15, 1998) (holding that Article 27, sections 553 and 554 of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland do not apply to consensual, non-
commercial, private sexual activities). . 
S See id. 
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matters.6 Sodomy laws prohibit conduct deemed to be 
immoral by the state and protect the public from disease 
and infection. These concerns represent legitimate state 
interests and the judiciary should maintain a high burden 
of proof for those seeking to overturn the law. 
This article will demonstrate how the Maryland courts 
have ignored precedent and rewritten valid legislation in 
an attempt to "keep up with the Joneses" during the 
nationwide frenzy of invalidating state sodomy statutes.7 
The circuit court's decision in Williams exemplifies the 
judicial fiat that now represents legal reasoning in the court 
system. 
II. WILLIAMS V. STATE 
In Williams v. State, six individuals challenged the 
validity of Article 27, section 554 of the Annotated Code 
of Maryland.8 Article 27, section 554 criminalizes 
sodomy, whether oral or anal, as an unnatural and 
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
7 See Gryczan v. State of Montana, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997); 
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S. W.2d 250 (Tenn. 1996); Commonwealth 
v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-588-TG, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v. 
Morales, No. 3-91-195, 826 S.W. 2d 201 (Tx. Ap. 1992). Bule! Miller 
v. State, No. 91-KA-00057, 636 S.2d. 391 (Miss. 1994); State v. Walsh, 
No. 67465, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). The court cites these cases as 
examples of states that have upheld their laws prohibiting sodomy and 
similar conduct. One of the cases cited by the court as affirming their 
anti-sodomy law, Christensen v. State, 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188 
(1996), has since been overtumed. See Powell v. State, 270 Ga 327, 510 
S.E.2d 18 (1998). 
8 MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 554 (1998). Section 554 reads as follows: 
Every person who is convicted of taking into his or her 
mouth the sexual organ of any other person or animal, or 
who shall be convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in 
the mouth of any other person or animal, or who shall be 
convicted of committing any other unnatural or perverted 
sexual practice with any other person or animal, shall be 
fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or 
be imprisoned in jail or in the house of correction or in the 
penitentiary for a period not exceeding ten years, or shall 
perverted practice.9 Four of the plaintiffs, Williams 
included, were members of the Maryland Bar. lo Each 
alleged that the existence of the statute placed them in 
constant fear of arrest and subsequent prosecution. I I They 
argued that as a result of this fear, they had suffered 
psychological injury and real or potential pecuniary 
damages. 12 Only one of the plaintiffs, Doe, had been 
arrested on a related crime of solicitation for attempting to 
engage in homosexual conduct with an undercover police 
officer. \3 Doe argued that if section 554 does not prohibit 
consensual, non-commercial, private homosexual conduct, 
then solicitation of such conduct should not be illegal. 14 
However, the court upheld the solicitation statute, noting 
that unlike the actual conduct, "an unwanted solicitation is 
neither private nor consensual."15 
The sixth plaintiff, who joined only as a taxpayer, 
asserted that state funds should not have been "wasted" 
in enforcing the sodomy statute. 16 
The court first noted that in order to seek a declaratoty 
judgment, a justiciable controversy must exist. 17 Ironically, 
the State argued that there was no justiciable issue since 
the statute is not enforced as to either heterosexuals or 
homosexuals as long as the conduct is consensual, 
noncommercial, and private.18 The court rejected the 
argument, observing that present and future State's 
Attorneys may interpret the statute differently.19 Therefore, 
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a legitimate fear 
be both fined and imprisoned within the limits above 
prescribed in the discretion of the court. 
9 See id. 
10 See Williams, at *1-2. 
II See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 See id. at *14. 
IS See id. at *15. 
16 See id. at *2. 
17 See id. at *4. 
18 See id. at *5. 
19 See id. at *9. 
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of prosecution and that this fear constituted a justiciable 
controversy .20 
III. THE "JUMPING OFF POINT": 
SCHOCHET V. STATE 
The Williams court analyzed the alleged constitutional 
issues by first aclmowledging that the ')umping off point" 
for the plaintiffs was Schochet v. State. 21 The defendant 
in Schochet was charged with seven counts of rape, as 
well as fellatio in violation of section 554.22 The State 
failed to establish that the sexual activity was non-
consensual and a jury subsequently acquitted the defendant 
of the rape charges.23 However, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on the fellatio charge.24 The court of special 
appeals affirmed, holding that there was "no constitutional 
protection for sexual activity - orthodox or unorthodox, 
heterosexual or homosexual - at least outside of 
marriage.''25 The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed 
the ruling below after considering two issues: (1) whether 
Article 27 section 554 encompasses "consensual, 
noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in the 
privacy of home," and if so, (2) whether it violates either 
the Constitution of the United States or the Maryland 
Declaration ofRights.26 
The Schochet court began its opinion by reviewing 
the canon of construction which demands that "if a 
legislative act is susceptible of two reasonable 
interpretations, one of which would not involve a decision 
as to the constitutionality of the act while the other would, 
the construction which avoids the determination of 
20 See id. 
21 320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990). 
22 See id. at 717, 580 A.2d at 178. 
23 See id. at 725,580 A.2d at 181. 
24 See id. at 723,580 A.2d at 180. 
2S Id. (quoting Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 339 (1988». The 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland "[r]eject[ed] the argument that 
Schochet's conviction violated a federal constitutional right to privacy." 
26 See id. at 717,580 A.2d at 177. 
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constitutionality is to be preferred."27 In order to avoid an 
unconstitutional interpretation of the statute, the court of 
appeals construed the statute narrowly and chose not to 
include within its scope "noncommercial, heterosexual 
activity between consenting adults in the privacy of the 
home,"28 thereby creating the exception upon which 
Williams was based.29 
Despite the good intentions of the judiciary, 
Schochet, like Williams, is an example of an unbridled 
court system. As the State argued in Schochet, the 
interpretation that created the exception can hardly be said 
to be a "reasonable" interpretation of the statute.30 The 
legislature in section 554 does not make a distinction 
between consensual and nonconsensual, public and 
private, commercial and noncommercial, or most 
importantly, heterosexual and homosexual activity.31 
Nonetheless, the Schochet court held that to give effect 
to the statute's broad language would raise questions as 
to its overall constitutionaIity.32 In support of this reasoning, 
the court cited the split amongst the states concerning 
whether such conduct could be prohibited by legislative 
enactment. 33 
27Id. at 725,580 A.2d at 181 (quoting Heilman Brewing v. Stroh Brewery, 
308 Md. 746, 763-764 (1987)). 
28Id. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184. 
29 See Williams, at *13. The plaintiffs in Williams questioned why 
consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity, excluded by section 
554, should apply to homosexual activity in similar circumstances. 
30 See id. at 729, at 580 A.2d 183. 
31 See id.; see also, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1998). 
32 See id. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184. 
33 See id. at 726,580 A.2d at 182. The court looked to People v. Onofre. 
51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 
(1980) (holding as unconstitutional the invasion of privacy to attempt 
to regulate, through use of criminal penalty, consensual oral sex between 
persons of the opposite sex). The court also cited Commonwealth v. 
Balthazaar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E. 478 (1974) (interpreting statute 
narrowly so as to avoid constitutional issue as to whether consensual 
oral sex, in private, between members of the opposite sex, can be 
proscribed by statute). 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 8 
The court then catalogued all of the Maryland 
decisions considering section 554.34 Because no 
consensual, non commercial, heterosexual conduct had 
been prosecuted under section 554, the court found that 
this type of conduct was not within the contemplation of 
the drafters of section 554, and therefore, was not included 
within its application.35 After this lengthy review, the court 
decided to rewrite the statute, rather than give effect to 
the intent of the Maryland legislature. 
The decision of the court in Schochet simply does 
not follow logical reasoning. The Supreme Court has not 
yet overruled Bowers;36 therefore, it is inconsequential to 
Maryland courts how other state tribunals have ruled on 
similar statues in relation to application of their respective 
state constitutions.3' The only issue that need be 
considered by a Maryland court is the law passed by the 
Maryland legislature and its applicability to the Maryland 
constitution. The Schochetcourt, however, fails to mention 
the Maryland constitution or discuss its application to the 
issue at bar.38 Unfortunately, the court in Williams follows 
the same course of ambitious adjudication as demonstrated 
by the Schochet COurt.39 
The court of appeals in Schochet also rejected the 
argument forwarded by the State based on the legislative 
history surrounding section 554.40 The Maryland General 
Assembly proposed an amendment to a bill dividing rape 
into fIrst and second degrees, thus effectively repealing 
sections 553 and 554.41 The report from the Maryland 
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee commented that 
sections 553 and 554 should be repealed, as offenses 
34 See id. at 731,580 A.2d 184-85. The court categorized the cases into 
three types: (1) those that involved homosexual activity, (2) those that 
involved minors, and (3) those that involved a violation in a public place. 
See id. 
35 See id. at 733,580 A.2d at 185. 
36 See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186. 
37 See id. at 194-95. 
38 See Schochet, 320 Md. at 714, 580 A.2d at 176. 
39 See id. at 714, 580 A.2d 176. 
40 See id. at 734, 580 A.2d at 186. 
41 See id. at 733,580 A.2d at 186 (citing Pitcher, Rape and Other Sexual 
Offense Law Reform In Maryland, 7 U. BALT. L. REv 151 (1977)). 
under these sections were rarely prosecuted.42 However, 
when the bill was finally enacted it had been amended so 
as not to repeal the statutes at issue.43 The State, therefore, 
posited that because these sections were not repealed, 
the legislature intended sections 553 and 554 to apply to 
consensual, noncommercial heterosexual activity.44 The 
court found this argument "unpersuasive," and declared 
that the General Assembly "may have decided that 
consensual homosexual acts should still be prohibited."45 
This statement by the court of appeals appears to indicate 
that the judiciary anticipated no equal protection problem 
in applying section 554 to homosexuals but not to 
heterosexuals. Nevertheless, the Williams court disagreed, 
finding that section 554 violated the equal protection rights 
of an individual.46 
It is often said that "hard cases make bad law." In 
light of Schochet and the circuit court's expansion of that 
case, it may well be said that bad law will only make more 
hard cases. The reconstruction of section 55447 by the 
Schochet court has led the Williams court to also conduct 
an ad hoc exercise of judicial will, rather than a consistent 
and prudent exercise of judicial reasoning. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland attempted to avoid a constitutional 
privacy issue by creating a potential equal protection 
issue;48 the Williams decision attempted to address the 
equal protection problem and rendered a legislative 
enactment meaningless.49 Schochet certainly provides a 
')umping off point" on the issue. The concern though, is 
where we will land. 
42 See id. at 733-34, 580 A.2d at 186 (citing the Senate Judicia! Proceedings 
Committee report on Senate Bill 358). 
43 See id. at 734, 580 A.2d at 186. 
44 See id. 
4S [d. at 735,580 A.2d at 187. 
46 See Williams, at * 13-14. 
47 See Schochet, 320 Md. at 725-26,580 A.2d at 181-82. 
48 See id. 
49 See Williams, at *14. 
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IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
Rather than'defend the statute, the State in Williams 
argued before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that 
the Schochet ruling should not be extended to include 
consensual, noncommercial, homosexual activity in the 
privacy of the home.50 Otherwise, the State claimed, 
enforcement of section 554 would amount to an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 51 The circuit court 
agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to 
homosexual conduct, just as it does not apply to 
heterosexual conduct. 52 In a single paragraph, the court 
provides a scant analysis and announced, "[i]t cannot be 
doubted, as Defendants concede, that there wouid be an 
equal protection violation if acts, considered not criminal 
when committed by a heterosexual couple, could be 
prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple."53 
In the tradition of Schochet, the court then construed the 
statute so as not to include consensual, noncommercial, 
homosexual activity between adults in private.54 Other 
than the court using Schochet 's aphorism "in order to avoid 
serious constitutional issues," the court did not cite any 
Maryland case law or statute in support of its reasoning. 55 
The opinion in Williams suggests that the Equal 
Protection Clause would be violated because the Schochet 
case recognized a privacy interest in the context of 
heterosexual conduct. This is false. Schochet clearly 
stated that it was giving section 554 a narrow construction 
in order to avoid constitutional questions. 56 The 
unreasonable interpretation that Schochet gives to section 
554 certainly provides the appearance of clever 
constitutional adjudication, yet the court of appeals went 
so See id. at * 13. 
SI See id. at *13-14. 
S2 See id. 
S3 See id. at * 13. 
S4 See id. at *22. 
SS Id. 
S6 See id. at *10. The question remains, however, how there can be 
certainty as to the existence of a constitutional issue that has never been 
before a Maryland court. 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 9 
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to great lengths to indicate that it was avoiding the privacy 
issue. The Schochet decision does not hold that there is a 
right to privacy when engaging in consensual, 
noncommercial heterosexual conduct in private, rather, the 
court in Schochet holds that section 554 does not apply 
in this context. 57 Therefore, the Williams court clearly 
needed to look beyond Schochet for support of its ruling. 
A. The Uncle No One Talks About: Neville v. State 
In Neville v. State,58 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland provided guidance that the courts largely ignored 
in both Schochet and Williams. The court in Neville found 
the defendant guilty of violating section 554 for committing 
oral sodomy with a woman at an abandoned missile site. 59 
The court of appeals upheld the conviction on the grounds 
that the missile site was a public area and, therefore, the 
privacy rights ofthe defendant did not attach.60 After 
reviewing several United States Supreme Court opinions, 
as well as the applicable Maryland cases, the Neville court 
determined that "[i]t is clear from the foregoing review 
that there is no holding by the Supreme Court that the 
right of privacy applies to conduct of the type prohibited 
by Md. Code, Art. 27 §554."61 If there is no right to 
privacy for this type of behavior guaranteed under the 
United States Constitution, then such a privacy right must 
be found in state law ifit is entitled to the protection of the 
court. 
The defendant in Neville argued that the statute 
violated equal protection guarantees because it creates 
two classes: (1) a class of married people, whose right to 
privacy shields them from prosecution, and (2) a class of 
unmarried people, who are subject to prosecution under 
section 554.62 The right to privacy under section 554 
57 See Schochet, 320 Md. at 735,580 A.2d at IS6 
58 290 Md. 364,430 A.2d 570 (1981). 
59 See id. at 367, 430 A.2d at 572. 
("' See id. at 377,430 A.2d at 576-77. 
(,I Id. at 377,430 A.2d at 576. 
62 See id. at 381-82,430 A.2d at 579. 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 10 
would, therefore, attach to one class, but not to the other.63 
The court reviewed this argument and held that if a married 
couple was prosecuted under section 554, the marriage 
would not be a defense and no other privacy interest 
associated with marriage would apply.64 Under this 
rationale, it is fair to say that the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland would not find a right to privacy associated with 
the conduct proscribed by section 554. If this is the case, 
then the Williams court is merely hypothesizing when it 
says, "[i]t cannot be doubted that there would be an equal 
protection violation."65 
Further, the Neville court considered whether an 
intermediate standard of review applies that requires "a 
fair and substantial relation between the statute under 
consideration and the legitimate objective of the police 
power for which it was enacted."66 According to Neville, 
this standard applies where legislation involves important 
personal rights that do not merit strict scrutiny review, but 
are entitled to more protection than the rational relation 
test would afford.67 The court rejected the standard, 
holding that the practices proscribed by section 554 did 
not qualify as an "important personal right.''68 Instead, the 
court applied the rational relation test, and held section 
554 to be a valid exercise of Maryland' s police power in 
maintaining a decent society and protecting the public 
morality.69 In light of this precedent, it is surprising that a 
trial court could find that the sodomy statute would not 
survive equal protection analysis. 
63 See id. at 382, 430 A.2d at 579. 
64 See id. 
65 Williams, at * 13. 
66 Neville, 290 Md. at 383, 430 A.2d at 580. 
(,7 See id. 
681d. 
G'J See id. at 383-84, 430 A.2d at 580. 
v. THE VALIDITY OF SODOMY LA WS 
Having suffered defeat several times on the floor of 
the legislature, individuals seeking repeal of the sodomy 
laws have soughtreliefin the courts. Such plaintiffs advance 
the same policy argwnents that failed in the political process, 
and in a case such as Williams, these arguments act as an 
invaluable tool to supplement weak legal analysis. 
Nevertheless, the courts are willing to listen, and society 
is forced to enter an unconstitutional area where the process 
of judicial legislation occurs. 
A. Constitutionality of Sodomy Laws 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court held in Bowers 
v. Hardwick70 that there is no federal constitutional right 
to engage in sodomy. This opinion has been the subject 
of much commentary and criticism as it seemed to 
contradict a line of cases considering the right to privacy. 71 
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,72 the court 
stated that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees 
create zones of privacy. ''73 The Court in Bowers, however, 
refused to advance Griswold's "prenumbras" and 
"emanations" in the context of state sodomy laws.74 
The continued existence of Bowers was subsequently 
threatened by the decision of Romer v. Evans.75 In 
Romer, the Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 of the 
Colorado State Constitution, which precluded all legislative, 
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local 
71l See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186. 
71 See e.g., Michael L. Closen, Symposium on Health Care Policy: What 
Lessons Have We Learned From the AIDS Pandemic?, 61 ALB. L. REv. 
897 (1998); Mark John Kappelhoff, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There a 
Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 487 (1988). 
72 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(holding that the Connecticut law forbidding use 
of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital 
privacy). 
73 See id. at 484. 
74 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197. 
7S 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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government designed to protect the status of persons 
based on their homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, 
conduct, practices or relationships, violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 
Bowers, however, remains valid and provides keen insight 
into the Griswold line of cases.77 In Bowers, Justice White 
meticulously distinguished sodomy from the rights that had 
been declared implicit in the "right to privacy," asserting 
that the limits of this right had been discerned by Careyv. 
Population Services International. 78 The Court 
reviewed a number of privacy cases 79 and concluded that 
the "right to privacy," as defmed by these cases, became 
relevant only in the contexts of family, marriage, or 
procreation.80 Since there is no connection between 
sodomy and the interests of family, marriage, or 
procreation, the Court held that the "right to privacy" does 
not create a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 81 
Continuing its analysis, the Bowers Court held that 
because sodomy is not protected by the Constitution, it 
may be validly regulated by the police power of the states.82 
This police power includes the ability of the state to regulate 
matters between consenting adults in private, and can be 
76 See id. at 635. 
77 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (dealing with education and the raising of 
children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (concerning 
familial relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Willamson, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942) (dealing with procreation); Loving v Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (involving marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479 
(1965) (concerning contraception); Einsenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing abortion). 
78 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (finding that the decisions that an individual 
may make without unjustified government interference are personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, conception, family 
relationships, and child rearing and education). 
, 
79 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390 (dealing with 
education and the raising of children); Prince, 321 U.S. at 158 (concerning 
fami lial relationships); Skinner, 3 16 U. S. at 535 (dealing with procreation); 
Loving, 388 U.S. at I (involving marriage); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 
(concerning contraception); Einsenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438; Roe, 410 U.S. 
at 113 (discussing abortion). 
81l See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
81 See id. at 190. 
82 See id. at 195-96. See also, Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion 
that "[t]his is essentially not a question of personal preferences' but 
rather of the legislative authority of the State. I find nothing in the 
29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 11 
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sufficiently founded on the basis of morality. 83 In support 
of this statement, the Supreme Court noted that, "[t]he 
law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, 
and if all the laws representing moral choices are to be 
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts 
would be very busy indeed."84 Urging caution, Bowers 
provided a reminder that morality is traditionally within 
the state's police power.85 
B. Sodomy Laws and "Public Morality" 
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Neville 
characterized Article 27, section 554 as a valid exercise 
of the state's police power in its protection of the public 
morality.86 Critics of this justification argue that sodomy 
laws are outside of the concern for the public morality 
when it is consensual and private.87 But are sodomy laws 
actually "outside the realm of public morality" whenever 
sexual conduct occurs in private and with mutual consent? 
The answer should be a resounding no. For example, the 
following activities are still considered illegal: private, 
consensual sex between a man and a sixteen-year-old 
girl;88 bestiality in the privacy of the Griswoldian bedroom;89 
Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute challenged 
here." Id. at 196-97. 
83 See id. at 196. 
84 Id. 
USee id. 
86 See Neville, 290 Md. at 383, 430 A.2d at 580. 
87 See Comment, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the 
Context o/Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 636 (1986). 
88 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(3) (1998). 
89 This crime, like anal sodomy, is also prohibited by section 554 as an 
"unnatural and perverted practice." The Humane Society of the United 
States has recently launched a campaign to make sexual abuse of animals 
illegal; the group notes that bestiality was previously prosecuted under 
the sodomy laws that have since been struck down. See, Barbara 
Hagenbaugh, Us. Group Campaigns to Outlaw Animal Sex, RTw (Reuters 
World Report), March 16, 1999. See also <http://www.hsus.org>. 
29.2 U. Bait L.F. 12 
incestuous affairs between adults;90 private possession 
and ingestion of illicit drugs;91 private possession of child 
pornography;92 and private consensual, homosexual and 
heterosexual prostitution.93 These illustrations94 make it 
clear that "public morality" may, and in fact does, include 
consensual conduct that occurs in a private setting. 
Whenever the state regulates conduct for the sake 
of public morality, it is a policy-based determination made 
by the legislature that the conduct in question addresses, 
thereby affecting, the morality ofthe citizens of that state. 
It is perfectly valid for the state to make a legislative 
decision that reflects a deeper moral choice.95 Thus, the 
concern for the public morality is not limited to 
90 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 335 (1998) (it is a felony in Maryland to 
have carnal knowledge of another person, being within the degrees of 
consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited by law). 
9\ See MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 286 (1998) (it is unlawful in Maryland to 
manufacture, distribute, counterfeit, manufacture a controlled dangerous 
substance or possess certain equipment for the purpose of using 
controlled dangerous substances). 
92 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252. 
93 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 15(e) (1998) (it is unlawful in Maryland 
to procure or to solicit or to offer to procure or solicit for the purpose 
of prostitution, lewdness or assignation). 
94 The Court in Bowers also made use of this illustration and concluded: 
And ifrespondent's submission is limited to the voluntary 
sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be 
difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to 
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution 
adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they 
are committed in the home. Weare unwilling to start down 
that road. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96. 
In Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Sianton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973), the 
Court also rejected the idea that conduct between consenting adults is 
always beyond state regulation. The Court stated: 
Our Constitution establishes a broad range of conditions 
on the exercise of power by the states, but for us to say 
that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that 
conduct involving consenting adults is always beyond state 
regulation, is a step we are unable to take. 
The Court went on to cite examples such as prostitution, duels, 
bigamy, adultery, and fornication. Paris AdultTheatre 1,413 U.S. at 68, 
n.15. 
95 In Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court quoted Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476,485 (1957) stating that the state can legitimately act in order to 
protect "the social interest in order and morality." Paris Adult Theatre, 
413 U.S. at 61. The Court further stated that a law should not be 
invalidated simply because it "reflects unprovable assumptions about 
what is good for people." Id. at 62. 
nonconsensual conduct or conduct that occurs in public. 
"Public momlity" should be construed to mean the momlity 
a/the public, not merely morality in public. As noted 
above, this power to proscribe conduct is only restrained 
by the federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, unless 
the conduct is protected by some constitutional right, it 
may be validly proscribed by the state's police power. 
Moreover, the purpose of the sodomy law is to 
encourage moral behaviof16 (i.e., that which is productive, 
healthy, or otherwise beneficial for the individual or society) 
and to discourage immoral behavior. Even if such moral 
behavior is not practiced in private homes, these laws have 
the effect of restraining immoral, unhealthy conduct and 
preventing its normalization.97 To invalidate a law, not 
because it is unconstitutional, but merely because it reflects 
a moral decision on the part of the legislature, is to deprive 
the states of their constitutional right to regulate the conduct 
oftheircitizens.98 To strip the state of the moral dimension 
of its police power is to render the state helpless in 
controlling and confronting conflicts for which its citizens 
expect a remedy. Arguing that the state has no interest in 
the public morality beyond the public forum necessarily 
undermines what has traditionally been delegated to the 
states. 
C. Sodomy Laws and Public Health 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that a state 
may validly exercise its police powers in the interest of 
public health.99 This is especially important in the advent 
of the HIV / AIDS epidemic and the explosion of other 
sexually transmitted diseases. States are struggling to find 
a way to reduce the rapid spread of disease, and many 
experimental measures have been tried. 100 It has been 
96 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. 
97 See id. 
98 See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
99 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)( quoting Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 
(1985) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724,756 (1985)). 
100 See Comment, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the 
Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.MIAMI L.REv. at 631-34. 
Articles 
proposed that the HIV / AIDS crisis has a much greater 
impact on homosexuals and intravenous drug users. \01 As 
a corollary, those who engage in intravenous drug use and 
unprotected sex are categorized as "high risk" for 
contracting the HIV virus. 102 If the tide of this epidemic is 
to be turned, then such "high risk" behavior must become 
the focal point of our concern. 
The most recent statistics available from the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention highlight the need to 
control "high-risk" sexual behavior. 103 Homosexual men 
represent fifty-seven percent of the cumulative total number 
of AIDS cases through 1998 in the United States, a far 
larger percentage than any other category.104 
Furthermore, sodomy, whether heterosexual, homosexual, 
or bisexual, inevitably leads to rectal and prostate damage 
which may lead to the onset of AIDS, hepatitis B, and 
other sexually transmitted diseases. lOS Former Surgeon 
General C. Everett Koop has stated that "anal intercourse, 
even with a condom, is simply too dangerous a practice."I06 
101 See United States Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, REVIEW 
OFTHE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES REsPONSE TO AIDS 6 (WASH., D.C.) (pub. 
No. OTA-TM-H-24) (Feb. 1'985). 
1112 See id. 
1113 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIVI AIDS SURVEILLANCE 
REpORT, Midyear Edition, Vol. 10, No.1 (1998). 
104 See id. at 12, Table 5. In contrast, heterosexual males represent only 
four percent of AIDS cases. ld. If the figures are totaled by race or 
ethnicity, the greatest percentage of AIDS cases is again found among 
homosexual males. ld. at 16, Table 9. Of males between the ages of 
thirteen and nineteen, homosexuals represent thirty percent of the total 
number of AIDS cases, while heterosexual males comprise only nine 
percent. !d. at 26, Table 18. Between the ages of twenty and twenty-
four, homosexual males represent sixty-three percent, while heterosexual 
males represent only four percent. ld. Even though the Centers report 
that AIDS incidence is declining in all groups, statistics show that 
homosexual behavior carries with it a greater risk of infection. 
10, See The Causes of Male Homosexuality, Why is Homosexuality not a 
Normal Sexual Variation?, National Association for Research and 
Therapy of Homosexuality. 
1116 Celia Hooper, Surgeon General Advises Doctors to Teach Patients 
about Condoms, United Press International, Oct. 13, 1987. 
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Statutes such as section 554 of the Maryland 
Annotated Code, were enacted to prohibit "unnatural or 
perverted practices" among all classes of people and serves 
to curtail risks that arise as a result of such behavior. It is 
clear that controlling this behavior is within the state's 
power to regulate conduct for the sake of the public health. 
In light of the statistics cited, it would be prudent for the 
state maintain such a statute. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is the duty of a trial court to apply the law as it is 
written to the set of facts to be decided. Considering the 
Williams ruling, however, this statement is worth repeating. 
Williams relies on the rulings of other state courts that 
have interpreted their own state constitutions regarding 
the statutes that had been approved by their state 
legislatures. Williams also relies on Schochet, a case that 
is exceptional for its willful construction of the law and 
analysis that similarly ignores its own precedent. It should 
be recognized that a constitutional issue in one state is not 
necessarily a constitutional issue in every state. A tribunal 
does not fulfill its duty merely by pronouncing that other 
courts are divided on the issue, and then arbitrarily deciding 
whether it is to fall on the "pro" or "con" side. 
Lastly, it is well within the state's legislative power to 
prohibit conduct that is not constitutionally protected. 
States have always had the ability to criminalize conduct 
that was considered indecent in order to maintain the 
morality of the citizenry. The state's power to regulate 
immoral conduct extends not only to public activities, but 
to activities engaged within private arenas as well. 
Additionally, it has been generally held that the state has a 
compelling interest in promoting public health and safety. 
Sodomy laws, therefore, come well within the legislative 
territory of the states. The fact that the critics of these 
laws have failed to persuade the states otherwise is not an 
argument against the validity of enacted statutes. 
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